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ABSTRACT
Adding a return factor based on capital investment into standard, calendar-time factor regressions
makes underperformance following seasoned equity offerings largely insignificant and reduces its
magnitude by 37-46%. The reason is that issuers invest more than nonissuers matched on size and
book-to-market. Moreover, the low-minus-high investment-to-asset factor earns a significant
average return of 0.37% per month. Our evidence suggests that the underperformance results from
the negative investment-expected return relation, as predicted by Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino
(2005).
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We study long-term underperformance following seasoned equity oerings (SEOs). Our
central nding is that adding a return factor based on capital investment into the CAPM
and the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model makes the underperformance largely
insignicant and reduces its magnitude by around 40%.
Two forces drive this result. First, equity issuers invest much more than matching non-
issuers with similar size and book-to-market. In the year preceding the SEOs, the median
investment-to-asset ratio of issuers is on average 0.090 from 1970 to 2003. In contrast, this
ratio is 0.054 for matching nonissuers, about 40% lower. Similar dispersion in investment-to-
asset ratios persists for two years and does not disappear until about ve years after equity
issuance. Second, capital investment is negatively related to future average returns. We con-
struct a zero-cost portfolio by buying stocks with the lowest 30% investment-to-asset ratios
and selling stocks with the highest 30% investment-to-asset ratios. This portfolio, which
we call the investment factor, earns an average return of 0.37% per month with a highly
signicant t-statistic of 4.35, controlling for size and book-to-market.
Our evidence lends support to the predictions of Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2005)
and Zhang (2005). In their real options model, Carlson et al. argue that rms have expansion
options and assets in place prior to equity issuance. This composition is levered and risky.
If capital investment is nanced by equity, then risk must decrease because investment in
eect extinguishes the risky growth options. Using a dierent but equivalent argument from
the Q-theory, Zhang derives the negative relation between investment and future average re-
turns. Intuitively, investment increases with the net present value (NPV) of future cash ows
generated by one additional unit of capital (e.g., Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2006, chapter6)). Controlling for expected cash ows, the NPV decreases with the cost of capital, giving
rise to the negative relation between investment and the cost of capital, or expected return.
Further, rms' balance-sheet constraint implies that the sources of funds must add up to the
uses of funds, suggesting that issuers must invest more than nonissuers. The SEO underper-
formance then follows from the negative relation between investment and expected returns.
We also examine two related hypotheses. First, the overinvestment hypothesis (e.g.,
Richardson and Sloan (2003)) suggests that the SEO underperformance is driven by the neg-
ative investment-return relation that arises from investors underreacting to overinvestment
of empire-building managers (see also Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004)). Second, Eckbo, Ma-
sulis, and Norli (2000) show that a six-factor model can explain the SEO underperformance
in their sample. Eckbo et al. argue that issuing equity lowers nancial leverage for issuers,
thus reducing their loadings on risk factors and expected returns relative to nonissuers.
Our evidence is inconsistent with the overinvestment hypothesis. We document that the
negative investment-return relation is even stronger among rms with stronger shareholder
rights, which should be less vulnerable to overinvestment by empire-building managers, than
that among rms with weaker shareholder rights. Moreover, issuers have on average lower
governance and entrenchment indexes, suggesting stronger shareholder rights and less vulner-
ability to overinvestment than matching nonissuers. We measure the strength of shareholder
rights using the corporate governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and the
entrenchment index of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005).
Our evidence is also inconsistent with the leverage-based explanation of SEO underper-
formance on three dimensions. First, the Eckbo-Masulis-Norli (2000) six-factor model fails
to reduce the underperformance to insignicant levels in our sample that consists of more
2than 8,000 SEOs.1 Second, the cross-sectional relation between leverage and future returns
is ambiguous. Using cross-sectional regressions, we show that market leverage correlates
with future returns positively, but book leverage correlates with future returns negatively,
a pattern also documented in Fama and French (1992).2 Third and most importantly, even
after equity issuance, issuers have market and book leverage ratios higher than matching
nonissuers. From 1970 to 2003, the median market leverage of issuers at the scal yearend
following the issuance is 0.22, slightly higher than that of matching nonissuers, 0.19. The
median book leverage of issuers is 0.36, about 42% higher than that of nonissuers, 0.21. Fur-
ther evidence from 60-month post-event window shows that, although issuing equity lowers
issuers' leverage ratios in the rst two years, they remain signicantly higher than those of
nonissuers throughout the post-event window.
Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) document that SEO rms are concentrated among
small-growth rms, and suggest that their underperformance reects a more pervasive re-
turn pattern captured by the Fama-French (1993) size and book-to-market factors. Brav and
Gompers (1997) make a similar argument in the context of IPOs. Our evidence lends sup-
port to their argument because both equity issuers and small-growth rms invest more than
other rms. We suggest that capital investment is the common link between these two types
of rms, and is likely to be the more fundamental driving force of their underperformance.
Our paper bridges the literatures on the new issues puzzle and on the investment-return
relation. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Aeck-Graves (1995) rst document
that SEO rms underperform nonissuers with similar characteristics during three to ve years
1Eberhart and Siddique (2002) also report that the Eckbo-Masulis-Norli model cannot make the under-
performance insignicant in their sample of 189 SEOs issued by 140 industrial rms from 1980 to 1992.
2Fama and French (1992) argue that, because the slope on book leverage and the slope on market leverage
are opposite in sign but relatively close in magnitudes, it is the dierence between market and book leverage,
i.e., book-to-market, that helps explain average returns.
3after the issuance. Kang, Kim, and Stulz (1999) document similar underperformance follow-
ing seasoned equity and convertible bond issuance among Japanese rms. Cochrane (1991)
documents the negative relation between investment and future average returns in the time
series. Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) nd a similar association in the cross section. Li, Vassa-
lou, and Xing (2004) use sectoral investment growth rates to price the cross-section of returns,
including the small-growth portfolio. Anderson and Garcia-Feij oo (2005) nd that invest-
ment growth conditions subsequent classication of rms to size and book-to-market port-
folios. Xing (2005) shows that rms with low investment growth or low investment-to-asset
ratios have signicantly higher expected returns, and that a return factor based on investment
contains similar information as HML and explains the value eect empirically as well as HML.
To our knowledge, the only other paper that also connects the aforementioned two liter-
atures is Richardson and Sloan (2003), who show that the external nancing-return relation
is strongest when the proceeds are invested in non-cash assets. Our work complements theirs
because both papers argue that capital investment is likely to be an important driving force
of the SEO underperformance. But our paper diers from theirs in several important ways.
First, we use factor regressions, while Richardson and Sloan use panel regressions. Second,
our investment-related evidence is much more detailed. More importantly, Richardson and
Sloan interpret the negative investment-return relation as investors underreacting to over-
investment and aggressive accounting. We argue, on the other hand, that the evidence is
consistent with optimal investment based on recent theoretical work of Carlson, Fisher, and
Giammarino (2005) and Zhang (2005). We try to distinguish between the two competing
hypotheses and nd evidence inconsistent with the overinvestment hypothesis.
Our paper is also related to Schultz (2003), who argues that event studies are likely
to result in negative ex-post abnormal performance, even though there is no ex-ante un-
4derperformance.3 Weighing each period equally as in calendar-time regressions solves this
problem. Our investment hypothesis focuses on ex-ante underperformance and thus applies
to calendar-time evidence.
Section 2 develops the investment hypothesis of the SEO underperformance. Section 3
describes our data. Section 4 reports our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Hypothesis Development
The investment hypothesis of SEO underperformance argues that the underperformance
arises from the negative association between capital investment and expected returns. This
hypothesis can be split into two parts. First, the association between capital investment and
expected returns should be negative. Second, if investment is nanced by issuing new equity,
then issuers should have lower expected returns than nonissuers.
Intuitively, a rm's investment increases with the value of positive-NPV projects. The
NPVs of new projects are inversely related to their costs of capital or expected returns,
ceteris paribus. If the costs of capital are high, then the NPVs are low, giving rise to a
low investment-to-asset ratio for the rm. If the costs of capital are low, then the NPVs are
high, giving rise to a high investment-to-asset ratio. Figure 1 illustrates the negative relation
between investment and expected returns.
The negative investment-return relation is the central prediction in recent theoretical
literature on investment-based asset pricing. Two dierent approaches have been used to
develop this relation. The rst approach is based on real options theory. In Berk, Green, and
3If early in a sample period, SEOs underperform, there will be few SEOs in the future because investors
would be less interested in them. The average performance will be weighted more towards the early SEOs
that underperformed. If early SEOs outperform, there will be more SEOs in the future. The early positive
abnormal performance will be weighted less in the average performance. Viswanathan and Wei (2005) show
that nonstationarity in the number of event process is necessary to generate a large negative bias emphasized
by Schultz (2003).
5Naik (1999), rms invest more when they have many low-risk projects. Investment thus low-
ers risk and expected returns. In Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004, 2005), expansion
options are riskier than assets in place. Investment extinguishes the riskier expansion options,
transforming them into less risky assets in place, and reduces risk and expected returns.
The second approach is based on the Q-theory. Cochrane (1991, 1996) rst derives the
negative investment-return relation from the Q-theory. In his model, rms invest more when
their marginal q is high, where the marginal q is the net present value of future cash ows
generated from one additional unit of capital. Given expected cash ows, high marginal q is
associated with lower costs of capital. The basic mechanisms driving the investment-return
relation in the real options and the Q-theory models are similar because the two approaches
are mathematically equivalent (e.g., Abel, Dixit, Eberly, and Pindyck (1996)).
Figure 1 also shows that equity issuers are associated with the right end of the curve,
where expected returns are low, and nonissuers are associated with the left end of the curve,
where expected returns are high. Intuitively, the balance-sheet constraint requires that the
uses of funds must equal the sources of funds. Equity issuers thus tend to be rms with high
investment-to-asset ratios, and vice versa. Based on this observation, Carlson, Fisher, and
Giammarino (2005) and Zhang (2005) argue that SEO rms must invest more and should
earn lower expected returns than matching nonissuers ex-ante.
Although we test the investment hypothesis in the context of SEOs, the investment-return
relation in principle also applies to other external nancing anomalies. These anomalies in-
clude the underperformance following initial public oerings (e.g., Ritter (1991)), debt oer-
ings (e.g., Spiess and Aeck-Graves (1999)), private placements of equity (e.g., Hertzel, Lem-
mon, Linck, and Rees (2002)), and loan announcements (e.g., Billett, Flannery, and Garnkel
(2005)), as well as overperformance following dividend initiations (e.g., Michaely, Thaler, and
6Womack (1995)), tender oers (e.g., Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990)), and open market
share repurchase (e.g., Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995)). Zhang (2005) argues
that these anomalies are all potentially driven by optimal investment. Intuitively, from the
balance-sheet constraint, rms raising capital should invest more and earn lower expected
returns, and rms distributing capital should invest less and earn higher expected returns.
3 Data
We obtain our sample of SEO rms from Thomson Financial's SDC database and monthly
returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The sample period is from
1970 to 2003. The monthly returns of the Fama and French (1993) factors, the returns of
the momentum factor, and the risk-free rate are from Kenneth French's website. We obtain
accounting information from the Compustat Annual Industrial Files.
Our sample selection criteria largely follow previous studies. To be included, a SEO
must be performed by a U.S. rm, which must have returns on CRSP at some point during
the ve-year period after its oering. We exclude unit oerings and secondary oerings in
which new shares are not issued. We also exclude SEOs of rms that trade on exchanges
other than NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. Similar to Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) and
Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000), but dierent from Loughran and Ritter (1995), we include
SEOs of utilities in our sample. Exclusion of utilities from the sample does not change our
results materially because the proportion of utilities is relatively small, about 13%. Follow-
ing Loughran and Ritter, we dene utilities as rms with SIC codes ranging between 4,910
and 4,949. The results are also robust to the exclusion of mixed oerings from the sample.4
Table 1 reports the number of SEOs for each year in the sample, the number of SEOs
4A mixed oering is a combination of a primary oering, in which new shares are issued, and a secondary
oering, in which shares change ownership but no new equity is issued.
7matched with CRSP using CUSIPs and historical CUSIPs, the numbers of equity issues for
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ rms, the number of primary and mixed oerings, and the number
of oerings by non-utilities and non-nancial rms. From the last row of Table 1, our sample
includes 11,092 SEOs with 8,126 SEOs having stock price data. Because of the long sample
period of 34 years, our sample seems to be the largest in the literature. For comparison,
Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli's (2000) sample includes 4,766 SEOs, Loughran and Ritter's (1995)
contains 3,702 SEOs, and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers's (2000) includes 4,622 SEOs.
The second column of Table 1 contains the number of SEOs for each year in the sample,
and the fourth column shows the number of SEOs obtained by matching SDC and CRSP
rms based on their CUSIP numbers. Comparing these two columns reveals that matching
by both current and historical CUSIPs increases the number of SEOs by more than 28%.
This increase is especially pronounced during the earlier years in the sample, in which it
often exceeds 60%. The sample of SEOs is heavily tilted towards NYSE rms in the 1970's,
but NASDAQ rms dominate the latter part of the sample.
Panel A of Figure 2 presents the frequency distribution of equity issuers across quintiles
of size and book-to-market. To generate this result, we merge CRSP returns (matched with
SDC data) from July of year t to June of year t+1 with Compustat accounting data at scal
yearend in calendar year t 1. We measure the market size as the share price at the end of
June times shares outstanding. Book equity is the stockholder's equity (item 216), minus
preferred stock, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (item 35) if
available, minus post-retirement benet asset (item 330) if available. If stockholder's equity
is missing, we use common equity (item 60) plus preferred stock par value (item 130). If
these variables are missing, we use book assets (item 6) less liabilities (item 181). Preferred
stock is dened as preferred stock liquidating value (item 10), or preferred stock redemption
8value (item 56), or preferred stock par value (item 130) in that order of availability. To
compute the book-to-market ratio, we use December closing price times number of shares
outstanding. The quintile breakpoints are from Kenneth French's website.
Consistent with Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000), we nd that issuers tend to be small-
growth rms. Firms in the smallest size quintile and the lowest book-to-market quintile issue
seasoned equity about six times more frequently than rms in the largest size and the highest
book-to-market quintiles. Panel B of Figure 2 reports the median new equity-to-asset ratio
among issuers by size and book-to-market quintiles. We measure this ratio as the market
value of new equity from SDC divided by the book assets at the scal yearend preceding
a SEO. The distribution of the median new equity-to-asset across size and book-to-market
quintiles is similar to the frequency distribution reported in Panel A. Small-growth rms issue
equity not only more frequently, they also issue much more as a percentage of their asset
value. For example, the median new equity-to-asset of issuers that belong to the small-growth
portfolio is about 55 times higher than that of issuers that belong to the big-value portfolio.
4 Empirical Results
Section 4.1 documents SEO underperformance in our sample. Section 4.2 constructs a com-
mon factor of returns based on capital investment. Section 4.3 presents our central nding
that investment drives the SEO underperformance. To understand the underlying intuition,
Section 4.4 examines the investment behavior of issuers relative to that of nonissuers. Section
4.5 tests two alternative explanations of SEO underperformance.
94.1 Documenting SEO Underperformance
We measure SEO underperformance as Jensen's alphas from factor regressions. We use fac-
tor regressions because recent literature has discussed in depth the diculties in obtaining
unbiased inferences using cumulative abnormal returns and buy-and-hold returns.5 The fac-
tor models we use include the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, as
in Ritter (2003). The dependent variable in the factor regressions is the portfolio return of
SEO rms in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate. The SEO portfolio consists of all
the rms that have issued seasoned equity in the past 36 months. For robustness, we also
use an alternative period of 60 months.
Panel A of Table 2 reports factor regressions using portfolios of rms with prior 36-
month SEOs. It shows that the alpha from the CAPM regression of the equally-weighted
SEO portfolio is  0.28% per month with a marginally signicant t-statistic of  1.91. The
alpha of the value-weighted SEO portfolio in the CAPM regression is  0.36% per month with
a signicant t-statistic of  3.56. The results from the Fama-French model are similar. The
alpha of the equally-weighted SEO portfolio in the Fama-French model is  0.29% per month
with a signicant t-statistic of  2.89, and the alpha of the value-weighted portfolio is  0.28%
with a signicant t-statistic of  2.92. Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) do not report the
CAPM regressions, but our alphas from the Fama-French model are similar to theirs.
The literature has also dened the SEO portfolios as consisting of rms that have issued
seasoned equity in the prior 60 months. Panel B of Table 2 reports the factor regressions
using this denition of SEO portfolios. Comparing Panels A and B shows that the magni-
tudes of the SEO underperformance are somewhat lower using prior 60-month SEOs. But
5Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), Fama (1998), Mitchell and Staord (2000), among
others, discuss the diculty of computing unbiased signicance levels using buy-and-hold returns. Schultz
(2003) and Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005) discuss the diculty with cumulative abnormal returns.
10the alphas of the equally-weighted and value-weighted SEO portfolios from the Fama-French
model and the alpha of the value-weighted SEO portfolio from the CAPM regression are all
signicant. And their magnitudes, ranging from  0.21% to  0.25% per month or  2.5% to
 3% per annum, are economically meaningful.
Perhaps surprisingly, Table 2 shows that the equally-weighted underperformance is lower
in magnitude than the value-weighted underperformance using the CAPM. And their mag-
nitudes are similar using the Fama-French three-factor model. This pattern diers from that
found in previous studies, as summarized by Ritter (2003, Table 3), i.e., equally-weighted
underperformance is larger in magnitude than value-weighted underperformance.
This dierence can be reconciled by two observations. First, all the studies cited in Ritter
only measure the underperformance with the Fama-French model. Second, when we restrict
our sample period to that comparable to previous studies, we largely replicate previous nd-
ings. Specically, using our sample of SEOs from 1975 to 1996 and prior 60-month SEO port-
folios, we nd that the equally-weighted alpha from the Fama-French model to be  0.32%
per month (t-statistic =  4.26). And the value-weighted alpha is almost halved,  0.15%
(t-statistic =  1.80). For comparison, using the same sample period and denition of SEO
portfolios, Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) report an equally-weighted alpha of  0.37%
per month (t-statistic =  4.81) and a value-weighted alpha of  0.14% (t-statistic =  1.36).
Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000, EMN) show that the SEO underperformance from their
six-factor model is insignicant. These factors include (i) RM, the excess return on the CRSP
value-weighted market index; (ii) 4RPC, a factor mimicking portfolio for the percent change
in the real per capita consumption of nondurable goods; (iii) BAA AAA, a factor mimicking
portfolio for the dierence in the monthly yield changes on bonds rated BAA and AAA by
Moody's; (iv) UI, a factor mimicking portfolio for unanticipated ination generated from
11a model of expected ination involving a regression of return on 30-day Treasury bills less
ination onto 12 of its lagged values and a constant; (v) 20y 1y, the return dierence between
Treasury bonds with 20 years to maturity and Treasury bonds with one year to maturity;
and (vi) TBILLspr, the return dierence between 90-day and 30-day Treasury bills.
Table 3 replicates their analysis using our sample. The sample period is from January
1970 to December 2002 because the data of the EMN factors from yvind Norli end at
December 2002. The table shows that the EMN result is largely specic to their sample. In
our sample with more than 8,000 SEOs, the EMN model performs worse than the CAPM
and the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model in explaining the SEO underperformance.
Specically, when we regress equally-weighted excess returns of prior 36-month SEO port-
folio onto the EMN factors, we obtain an alpha of  0.52% with a signicant t-statistic of
 3.22. And its value-weighted counterpart is  0.36% (t-statistic =  3.38). The evidence
suggests that there is room to explore other factors underlying the SEO underperformance.6
4.2 Constructing the Investment Factor
As a direct test of the investment hypothesis outlined in Section 2, we augment traditional
factor models with a common factor based on capital investment. This factor is the zero-cost
portfolio from buying stocks with the lowest 30% investment-to-asset ratios and selling stocks
with the highest 30% investment-to-asset ratios, controlling for size and book-to-market.
Specically, we construct the investment factor from a 3  3  3 sort on size, book-to-
market, and investment-to-asset ratio. We measure investment-to-asset as the annual change
in gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat item 7) divided by the lagged book value
6In untabulated results, we nd that the underperformance of SEO rms is insignicant in the Carhart
(1997) four-factor regressions, a nding also documented in Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000). Similar
to Brav et al., we do not interpret this evidence as suggesting no SEO underperformance. The reason is
that both the economic forces driving momentum prots and their connections to long-term performance
following equity issuance are unclear. In short, we are reluctant to use one anomaly to explain another.
12of assets (item 6). In June of each year, we sort stocks in ascending order independently on
size, book-to-market, and investment-to-asset into three groups, the top 30%, the medium
40%, and the bottom 30%. By taking intersections of these nine portfolios, we classify all
rms into 27 portfolios. The investment factor, denoted INV, is dened as the average returns
of the low-investment portfolios minus the average returns of the high-investment portfolios.
Formally, let pijk, where i;j;k=1;2;3, denote the value-weighted portfolio returns of rms
in the ith group of size, the jth group of book-to-market, and the kth group of investment-to-









In the sample from January 1970 to December 2003, the average return of the investment
factor is 0.37% per month, or 4.4% per annum, with a heteroscedasticity-consistent t-statistic
of 4.35. This average return of the investment factor is both economically and statistically
signicant. For comparison, in the same sample period, the average market excess return is
0.47% per month, or 5.69% per annum (t-statistic = 2.00), and the average return of HML
is 0.49% per month, or 5.83% per annum (t-statistic = 2.65).
More importantly, standard factor models cannot capture much of the average return or
variation of the investment factor. Table 4 regresses the investment factor onto the market
excess return, the Fama-French (1993) three factors, and the EMN six factors. From the
rst row of Table 4, the investment factor has signicantly positive alphas of 0.40%, 0.27%,
and 0.28% per month in the CAPM, Fama-French, and the EMN models, respectively. All
the alphas are highly signicant. Moreover, the goodness-of-t coecients are generally low,
ranging from 1.09% in the CAPM to 12.44% in the Fama-French model. Using the EMN
six-factor model yields a goodness-of-t coecient of only 8.87%.7 The evidence suggests
that the investment factor captures sources of cross-sectional variation of stock returns that
7Regressing the investment factor onto the Carhart (1997) four factors yields an alpha of 0.18% (t-statistic
= 2.21) and a goodness-of-t coecient of 16.87%.
13are largely independent of those captured by standard factor models.
Table 4 also shows that the slope of the investment factor on HML, 0.20, is the highest
among all the slopes, and is highly signicant. In untabulated results, we nd that the un-
conditional correlation of the investment factor with HML is 0.33, much higher than those
with other factors ( 0.12 with MKT and  0.05 with SMB). This evidence suggests an im-
portant link between the investment factor and the value factor, consistent with the evidence
in Anderson and Garcia-Feij oo (2005) and Xing (2005).
Following Fama and French (1993), we interpret the investment factor as a common fac-
tor in the cross-section of returns. While Fama and French interpret their size and value
factors as risk factors motivated from ICAPM or APT, we do not take a stance on risk in-
terpretation of our investment factor. Two arguments support the risk interpretation. First,
none of the theoretical papers (e.g., Cochrane (1991) and Berk, Green, and Naik (1999), see
Section 2) that we use to motivate the construction of the investment factor assumes any
form of behavioral bias. Second, unlike size and book-to-market, investment-to-asset does
not directly involve market valuation, and is thus less likely to be aected by mispricing.
However, behavioral stochastic discount factors (e.g., Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001))
are also consistent with the predictions of the partial equilibrium models discussed in Section
2. Investor sentiment can in principle aect investment policy through shareholder discount
rates (e.g., Polk and Sapienza (2005)). Moreover, it is possible that characteristics-based and
covariance-based explanations of the expected-return variations are not mutually exclusive.
Under certain conditions, there exists a one-to-one mapping between covariances and char-
acteristics, suggesting that they can both serve as sucient statistics for expected returns
(e.g., Zhang (2005)). Consequently, our empirical goal is to search for a parsimonious factor
specication motivated by economic theory, behavioral or rational, a specication that can
14be used to quantitatively explain asset pricing anomalies.
4.3 Testing the Investment Hypothesis
Table 5 reports our central nding. Adding the investment factor into standard factor re-
gressions makes SEO underperformance largely insignicant and reduces its magnitude by
around 40%. From Panel A, the equally-weighted alpha of prior 36-month SEOs from the
CAPM decreases by 46% in magnitude from  0.28% to  0.15% per month. Its t-statistic
drops from  1.91 to  0.94. The equally-weighted alpha from the Fama-French (1993) model
decreases in magnitude from  0.29% to  0.17% per month, a reduction of 43% with the
t-statistic dropping from  2.89 to  1.62. We obtain similar results using the value-weighted,
prior 36-month SEOs. The alpha from the CAPM decreases from  0.36% without the in-
vestment factor to  0.20% per month with the investment factor, a reduction of 45% in
magnitude, with the t-statistic dropping from  3.56 to  2.12, albeit still being signicant.
The value-weighted alpha from the Fama-French model drops from  0.28% to  0.18%, a
reduction of 37% in magnitude. The t-statistic drops from  2.92 to  1.91.
Panel A of Table 5 also shows that the loadings of the SEO portfolios on the investment
factor are negative and signicant in all specications. The magnitudes of these loadings,
ranging from  0.32 to  0.47, are economically meaningful. Given the average return of
0.37% per month for the investment factor, these loadings can explain from 0.12% to 0.17%
per month, or 1.4% to 2% per annum of the SEO underperformance.
Panel B of Table 5 reports similar results using prior 60-month SEO portfolios. Once we
augment the factor models with the investment factor, the magnitudes of the SEO underper-
formance decrease by 36% to 45% in the CAPM and the Fama-French factor regressions. All
the alphas become insignicant. Moreover, the loadings of SEO portfolios on the investment
15factor are universally negative and, except for one case, highly signicant. The magnitudes
of the loadings range from  0.12 to  0.32, and can explain from 0.05% to 0.12% per month
or 0.6% to 1.4% per annum of the SEO underperformance.
Issuer-Purged Factor Regressions
Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that the Fama-French (1993) model as implemented tra-
ditionally has low statistical power for detecting SEO underperformance. The reason is that
these factor returns are constructed using in part the returns of the issuers being tested for
underperformance. Loughran and Ritter purge the size and value factors from issuing rms'
returns because the two factors are empirically motivated, and are not necessarily priced
risk factors in equilibrium. The market factor does not need to be purged because there are
many theoretical reasons to believe that it is a priced risk factor.
To quantify the eects of purging, we perform issuer-purged Fama-French factor regres-
sions with and without the investment factor. The data of the purged size and value factors
are from Jay Ritter's website. Loughran and Ritter (2000) construct these factors after
deleting all rms that have publicly issued equity during the prior ve years. We use the
same purging procedure to construct our purged investment factor. Because we purge out
prior 60-month SEOs, the sample used in purged factor regressions starts at January 1975.
Purging issuers does not aect the basic properties of the investment factor. The average
return of the purged investment factor, denoted pINV, is 0.35% per month or 4.2% per
annum with a t-statistic of 3.76. The alpha of the purged investment factor from the CAPM
regression is 0.38% per month (t-statistic = 4.00). And its alpha from purged Fama-French
factor regression is 0.29% per month (t-statistic = 3.04). Finally, the correlation between
the unpurged and purged investment factors is 0.90.
16Table 6 reports the issuer-purged factor regressions. Although weakened somewhat quan-
titatively, our basic result on the importance of investment in driving SEO underperformance
remains unchanged. From Panel A, adding purged investment factor into purged Fama-
French three-factor regression reduces the magnitude of underperformance for the equally-
weighted prior 36-month SEO portfolio by about 36% from  0.39% to  0.25% per month.
The corresponding t-statistic drops from  3.28 to  2.11, albeit still being signicant. The
value-weighted alpha drops by 23% in magnitude from  0.33% to  0.26% (the t-statistic
drops from  2.85 to  2.26). Panel B reports similar results using prior 60-month SEO
portfolios. The equally-weighted alpha drops by 37% from  0.28% to  0.17%, and the
value-weighted alpha drops by 23% from  0.23% to  0.18%. In both cases, adding purged
investment factor reduces signicant SEO underperformance to insignicant levels.
Table 6 also reports factor regressions with purged size and value factors but unpurged
investment factor. We also consider unpurged investment factor because investment emerges
as a priced factor across diverse equilibrium models in recent investment-based asset pricing
literature spurred by Cochrane (1991, 1996) and Berk, Green, and Naik (1999). Table 6
shows that using unpurged investment factor further reduces the magnitude of underperfor-
mance. The percentage reduction in the magnitude of alpha from adding the investment
factor into purged Fama-French (1993) model ranges from 43% for the value-weighted prior
36-month SEO portfolio to 50% for the equally-weighted, prior 60-month SEO portfolio. All
the alphas are insignicant in the augmented factor regressions.
Event-Time Factor Regressions
To study how the SEO underperformance evolves over the post-SEO years, we perform event-
time factor regressions (e.g., Ball and Kothari (1989)). The dierence between event-time
17regressions and calendar-time regressions is that we now have three separate SEO portfolios
on the left-hand side of regressions. The rst portfolio consists of rms that have issued
equity in the prior 12 months, the second portfolio consists of rms that have issued equity
between 13 and 24 months ago, and the third portfolio consists of rms that have issued
equity between 25 and 36 months ago.8
Tables 7 and 8 report event-time factor regressions with and without the investment
factor using equally-weighted and value-weighted SEO portfolios, respectively. The under-
performance appears mostly in the rst two years, especially in the second year. Specically,
from Panel A of Table 7, the equally-weighted alpha in the CAPM regression in the rst
post-event year is only  0.15% per month (t-statistic =  0.96). The alpha increases to
 0.63% (t-statistic =  3.77) in year two, and then drops to  0.02% (t-statistic =  0.12)
in year three. Using the Fama-French (1993) model yields similar results. Panel A of Table
8 reports similar results using value-weighted SEO portfolios. The dierence is that the
value-weighted alphas in year one from the CAPM and the Fama-French model are  0.30%
and  0.24% with signicant t-statistics of  2.52 and  2.07 respectively.
More importantly, depending on factor model and post-event horizon, adding the invest-
ment factor explains 28{75% of the equally-weighted underperformance and 23{50% of the
value-weighted underperformance. Specically, from Panel B of Table 8, the value-weighted
alphas from the CAPM and the Fama-French model reduce from signicant  0.30% and
 0.24% in year one to  0.15% (t-statistic =  1.34) and  0.14% (t-statistic =  1.22), re-
spectively. Although the investment factor explains a fair amount of underperformance, both
the equally-weighted and the value-weighted alphas from the CAPM and the Fama-French
8We have also used SEO portfolios that consist of rms with seasoned equity between 37 and 48 months
and between 49 and 60 months ago. But the underperformance mostly concentrates in the rst three post-
SEO years. To save space, we thus only present event-time regressions for the rst three post-SEO years.
18models remain economically and statistically signicant in the second post-event year.
The event-time regressions also reveal some interesting patterns on time-varying factor
loadings. The loadings on the investment factor are all negative, and are highly signicant in
most specications. The magnitudes of these loadings display a hump shape across the three
post-event years, where the loadings in year two are the highest. This loading pattern is
similar to the pattern in the magnitude of the underperformance across the post-event years.
4.4 Why Does Investment Help Explain SEO Underperformance?
We now ask why the investment factor helps explain the SEO underperformance. To this
end, we examine the investment behavior of seasoned equity issuers relative to nonissuers
with similar size and book-to-market. Our basic result is that issuers invest much more than
matching nonissuers at the time of issuance. The dispersion in investment-to-asset between
these two classes of rms does not converge until ve years after portfolio formation. Because
low-investment rms earn higher average returns than high-investment rms, it is natural
that the investment factor helps explain the underperformance.
Each month we independently sort all rms that have not issued equity within prior
60 months into quintiles of size and book-to-market using the breakpoints from Kenneth
French's website. As a result, we have 25 size and book-to-market portfolios of nonissuers.
For each issuer, we use these breakpoints to identify its matching portfolio. We then compare
the median characteristics of the matching portfolio with those of the issuer. We choose to
match issuers with nonissuers by size and book-to-market because these two characteristics
are primary determinants of the cross-section of returns (e.g., Fama and French (1992)).
Matching rms to individual nonissuers as in Loughran and Ritter (1997), instead of size
and book-to-market portfolios, produces quantitatively similar results.
19Figure 3 reports SEO rms' and matching rms' median investment-to-asset and prof-
itability in the 60 months after equity issuance. To measure statistical signicance of the
dierences in characteristics, we also report Z-statistics associated with Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank tests, following Loughran and Ritter (1997). The null hypothesis is that
the distributions of issuers' and nonissuers' characteristics are identical. Z-statistics between
 2 and 2 indicate failure to reject the null hypothesis.9
Panel A of Figure 3 documents a large dispersion in investment-to-asset between issuers
and matching nonissuers for most of the post-event window. In the rst year after is-
suance, issuers' investment-to-asset ratio is around 0.09, about 40% higher than nonissuers'
investment-to-asset ratio, around 0.055. This dispersion remains stable for almost two years
after issuance and then starts to decline. The investment-to-asset ratio of issuers converges
fully to that of non-issuers at the end of the 60-month post-event window. From Panel B, the
dispersion in investment-to-asset ratio is highly signicant, especially in the few years after
issuance. Finally, Panels C and D show that issuers are more protable than matching nonis-
suers in the rst three years after equity issuance, but become less protable than nonissuers
thereafter. But the dispersion in protability between issuers and matching nonissuers is both
economically and statistically less signicant than the dispersion in investment-to-asset.
Extending the event-time evidence in Figure 3, Table 9 reports calendar-time evidence
on issuers' and matching nonissuers' investment-to-asset and protability in the year pre-
ceding their SEOs. From Panel A, issuers invest more than nonissuers, and the dierence in
9Denote the dierence in the characteristic between issuer i and its matching portfolio by di. We rank
the absolute values of di's from 1 to n, where n is the number of SEOs. We next sum the ranks of the










Under the null, Z follows a standard normal distribution. Importantly, in rare cases the sign of the Z-
statistic can be inconsistent with the sign of the dierence between issuing rms' and matching portfolios'
median characteristics. The reason is that the Wilcoxon test is concerned with the whole distribution of
characteristics, and not just with the medians.
20investment-to-asset ratio is signicant for every year from 1970 to 2003. The sample average
investment-to-asset ratio of issuers is 0.09, about 40% higher than that of nonissuers, 0.054.
The Z-statistic is highly signicant, suggesting that issuers have a dierent distribution
of investment-to-asset than nonissuers. Panel B shows that issuers have somewhat higher
protability than nonissuers. But the magnitude of this dispersion is very small, only 0.001.
Although broadly consistent with the evidence in Loughran and Ritter (1997), our results
shed additional light on the driving forces of the SEO underperformance. Loughran and
Ritter document that issuers have higher ratios of capital expenditure plus R&D expense
relative to assets than nonissuers for four years after issuance. Specically, their Figure
1 reports that this ratio is about 10.5% for issuers and 6% for nonissuers at the time of
issuance. A comparison with Panel A of our Figure 3 reveals that this dispersion is mostly
due to capital investment, not R&D expense.
This evidence is important. First, our empirical analysis is motivated from the theoretical
work of Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2005) and Zhang (2005), who model directly the
relation between returns and capital investment, not R&D. Second and more importantly,
unlike the negative association between investment-to-asset and future returns, the empirical
association between R&D-to-asset and future returns is positive (e.g., Chan, Lakonishok and
Sougiannis (2001) and Chambers, Jennings and Thompson (2002)). Chu (2005) argues that
this dierence arises because growth options tend to be riskier than assets in place, and R&D
generates growth options, while capital investment extinguishes growth options.
Supplementing Table 9, Figure 4 presents the number of SEO rms across investment-
to-asset deciles. We sort nonissuing rms in June of each year on their investment-to-asset
ratios to obtain the decile breakpoints. We then assign each issuer to one of the deciles based
on the breakpoints. Figure 4 shows that issuers are likely to be rms with high investment-
21to-asset ratios. Firms in the highest investment-to-asset decile issue seasoned equity about
three and a half times more frequently than rms in the lowest investment-to-asset decile.
In sum, we present strong evidence that SEO rms invest much more than matching
nonissuers both before and after issuance. This evidence, combined with the fact that the
low-minus-high investment-to-asset factor earns a signicant 0.37% per month, explains why
this factor can substantially reduce the magnitude of SEO underperformance.
4.5 Exploring Alternative Hypotheses
This subsection explores two alternative explanations of the SEO underperformance.
Testing the Overinvestment Hypothesis
Similar to our hypothesis, the overinvestment hypothesis of Richardson and Sloan (2003) ar-
gues that the underperformance results from the negative relation between investment and
average returns. The big dierence is that while we argue that optimal investment drives the
negative relation between investment and expected returns, Richardson and Sloan argue that
investor underreaction to overinvestment by empire-building managers drives the negative re-
lation between investment and average abnormal returns, as in Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004).
We aim to distinguish the overinvestment hypothesis from our optimal-investment hy-
pothesis. Investor underreaction and overinvestment are two necessary conditions for the
overinvestment hypothesis to work. Testing underreaction directly would require a model of
the normal level of reaction. Because the literature has not converged on such a model, we
focus instead on the other necessary condition, i.e., overinvestment.
The idea is simple. Under the overinvestment hypothesis, the negative investment-return
relation should be stronger among rms more vulnerable to overinvestment by empire-
22building managers. To implement this idea, we split the sample into two based on ex-
ante measures of vulnerability to empire-building. We then perform Fama-MacBeth (1973)
cross-sectional regressions of future returns onto investment-to-asset ratio and compare the
magnitudes of the slopes across the two subsamples. As a more direct test, we also compare
measures of vulnerability to empire-building across issuers and matching nonissuers.
We measure a rm's vulnerability to empire-building using the corporate governance in-
dex of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). Democratic rms with strong shareholder rights
(low values of the governance index) should be less vulnerable to overinvestment than dic-
tatorial rms with weak shareholder rights (high values of the governance index). Indeed,
Gompers et al. show that rms with stronger shareholder rights have lower capital expen-
ditures and make fewer corporate acquisitions than rms with weaker shareholder rights.
Under the overinvestment hypothesis, rms with strong shareholder rights should display
weaker investment-return relation than rms with weak shareholder rights.
We take the intersection of our sample and the sample (from 1990 to 2003) of Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2003) from Andrew Metrick's website. This intersection gives us a sample
that has between 1315 and 1990 rms each year with an average of 1585 rms. We dene
the democratic sample with the governance index less than or equal to nine (the median)
and the dictatorial sample with the governance index greater than or equal to ten.
The evidence in Table 10 is inconsistent with the overinvestment hypothesis. Panels A
and B show that the slope on investment-to-asset ratio in univariate regressions is on average
 1.31 in the democratic sample. The slope is  0.79, about 40% lower in magnitude, in the
dictatorial sample. Adding size and book-to-market to the regression yields quantitatively
similar results. The slope on investment-to-asset becomes  0.94 in the democratic sample,
and its magnitude is more than 50% higher than that in the dictatorial sample,  0.44, which
23is insignicant. This evidence suggests that overinvestment is unlikely to be the driving force
of the negative investment-return relation.10
Our basic result is robust to using an alternative measure of vulnerability to empire-
building. Several papers have recently questioned the governance index constructed in Gom-
pers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) show that an entrench-
ment index based on six out of 24 IRRC provisions fully drives the negative relation between
the governance index and stock returns (see also Bebchuk and Cohen (2004)). The relation
between the entrenchment index and future stock returns is robust during the 1990{2003
period. In contrast, Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2005) show that the correlation between the
governance index and future returns exhibit a reversal from 2000 to 2003 following Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick's sample period from 1990 to 1999.
Further, the entrenchment index can be a more precise measure of vulnerability to empire-
building than the governance index. Among the six provisions included in the entrenchment
index are four provisions that limit the power of a majority of shareholders (staggered boards,
limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, and super-
majority requirements for charter amendments) and two provisions that reduce the likelihood
of a hostile takeover (poison pills and golden parachutes).
We repeat all the tests after replacing the governance index with the entrenchment index.
The sample is the interaction of our sample and the sample (from 1991 to 2003) of Bebchuk,
Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) from Lucian Bebchuk's website. We dene the low-entrenchment
sample with the entrenchment index less than or equal to two (the median) and the high-
entrenchment sample with the index greater than or equal to three. From Panels C and
10The weakly negative slopes on book-to-market in Table 10 are not surprising. The sample period in
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) is largely the expansionary period from 1990 to 2003, in which growth
rms outperformed value rms most of the time (e.g., Petkova and Zhang (2005)). And the sample mostly
contains large rms, among which the value premium is weak.
24D in Table 10, our basic result remains unchanged. The average slope on investment-to-
asset in univariate regressions is  0.91 in the low-entrenchment sample, but is  0.73 in the
high-entrenchment sample. If we control for size and book-to-market, the average slope on
investment-to-asset becomes  0.60 in the low-entrenchment sample, and the average slope
in the high-entrenchment sample is only  0.20.
Going further than analyzing the driving force of the investment-return relation, we
now examine the overinvestment hypothesis in the context of SEOs. If the overinvestment
hypothesis is true, issuers should have weaker shareholder rights (high governance index) and
higher degrees of entrenchment (high entrenchment index), and should be more vulnerable
to empire-building than matching nonissuers.
The evidence is again inconsistent with the overinvestment hypothesis. Panels A and B in
Table 11 report that, from 1990 to 2003, issuers have on average lower governance indexes,
suggesting stronger shareholder rights, than matching nonissuers, with the dierence in
means being signicant. Although the median governance index is the same across issuers
and nonissuers, the Wilcoxon test shows that the index distribution of issuers is more left-
skewed. Finally, Panels C and D report similar results using the entrenchment index.
Supplementing the calendar-time evidence in Table 11, the event-time evidence in Fig-
ures 5 and 6 shows basically the same picture. The median governance indexes of issuers
and nonissuers both equal nine during the rst two post-SEO years. Afterwards the me-
dian index of issuers drops to eight, while the index of nonissuers remains constant at nine.
The median entrenchment indexes of issuers and nonissuers remain at two throughout the
ve-year post-event window. But the Wilcoxon tests report consistently more left-skewed
governance-index and entrenchment-index distributions for issuers during the ve post-SEO
years. Issuers have lower mean governance and entrenchment indexes than matching nonis-
25suers, and the dierences in means are mostly signicant.
Testing the Leverage Hypothesis
Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) document that equity issuers have lower exposures to risk
factors such as unexpected ination, default spread, and changes in the slope of the term
structure. Their multifactor model based on these variables can reduce the SEO underper-
formance to insignicant levels. Eckbo et al. argue that issuing equity lowers issuers' leverage
and reduces their risk and expected returns relative to those of matching nonissuers.
A necessary condition for this explanation is that after SEOs, issuers should have lower
leverage than matching nonissuers. If issuers have higher leverage, their lower loadings on
risk factors than those of nonissuers must be driven by forces unrelated to leverage. As
a direct test, we compare market leverage and book leverage across issuers and matching
nonissuers. We nd that, contrary to the leverage hypothesis, issuers have higher leverage
than matching nonissuers even after equity issuance.
We measure book leverage as the sum of debt in current liabilities (item 9) and long-term
debt (item 34) divided by the lagged book value of assets. The denominator of the market
leverage ratio is the market value of the rm, which is the sum of the market value of equity
(December closing price times number of shares outstanding) and the book value of debt
(item 9 plus item 34). Our results are robust to changes in the denition of leverage, such
as classifying preferred equity as debt.
Table 12 reports that, from 1970 to 2003, both market and book leverage ratios of issuers,
measured at the scal yearend following issuance, are usually higher than those of nonissuers.
The median market leverage of issuers is 0.22, slightly higher than the median market leverage
of nonissuers, 0.19. And the Z-statistic from the Wilcoxon equal-distribution test is 16.96.
26Except for the year 2000, issuers have higher market leverage than nonissuers in all the other
years in the sample, and the dierence is mostly signicant. The dispersion in book leverage
is even larger. The book leverage of issuers is on average 0.36, while that of nonissuers is
only 0.21 (Z-statistic = 38.89). Issuers have higher book leverage than nonissuers during
every year in the sample, and the Z-statistics are all signicant.
Figure 7 reports the event-time evolution of leverage for issuers and matching nonissuers
for 60 months after issuance. From Panels A and C, although issuing equity lowers somewhat
the leverage ratios of issuers during the rst two post-event years, their leverage ratios are still
higher than those of matching nonissuers. The Z-statistics reported in Panels B and D sug-
gest that the dierences in leverage ratios are signicant throughout the post-event window.
In untabulated tests, we also conduct Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions
of future returns onto market and book leverage. In univariate regressions, book leverage
has a monthly average slope of  0.31% (t-statistic =  4.19). And the market leverage has
a average monthly slope of 0.38% (t-statistic = 1.45). When market and book leverage are
used jointly, their slopes are 0.91% (t-statistic = 3.00) and  0.78% (t-statistic =  6.11),
respectively. The pattern that the two leverage ratios are correlated to future returns but
with opposite signs is consistent with Fama and French (1992). But more importantly, the
negative relation between book leverage ratios and future returns is again inconsistent with
the leverage explanation of SEO underperformance.
Finally, the leverage hypothesis is inconsistent with underperformance following debt
oerings documented by Spiess and Aeck-Graves (1999). According to the leverage hy-
pothesis, issuing debt increases leverage and equity risk, debt issuers should thus outperform
matching nonissuers. But the evidence can be consistent with our investment hypothesis.11
11Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) also propose the liquidity hypothesis, i.e., issuing equity increases stock
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We study investment-related sources of long-run underperformance following seasoned equity
oerings. A return factor constructed by buying stocks with the lowest 30% investment-
to-asset ratios and selling stocks with the highest 30% investment-to-asset ratios, while
controlling for size and book-to-market, earns on average 0.37% per month with a highly
signicant t-statistic of 4.35. More importantly, adding this investment factor into standard
factor regressions makes the SEO underperformance largely insignicant and reduces its
magnitude by around 40%. The reason is that equity issuers invest much more than matching
nonissuers. In the year preceding issuance, the average investment-to-asset of issuers is 0.09,
40% higher than that of nonissuers, 0.055, the dierence being highly signicant.
Our evidence lends support to the investment-based models of SEO underperformance
proposed by Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2005) and Zhang (2005). Cochrane (1991,
1996) and Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) predict a negative relation between real investment
and expected returns. Carlson et al. and Zhang argue that this negative relation can poten-
tially drive the SEO underperformance because the balance-sheet constraint requires that
the uses of funds must add up to the sources of funds. Issuers thus invest more and earn
ex-ante lower rates of return than matching nonissuers.
We also document new evidence inconsistent with existing explanations based on over-
investment (e.g., Richardson and Sloan (2003)) and leverage (e.g., Eckbo, Masulis, and
Norli (2000)). Inconsistent with the overinvestment theory, the negative investment-return
relation is even stronger among rms with strong shareholder rights, manifested by low
turnover and trading volume, thereby lowering issuers' liquidity risk and expected returns required to com-
pensate for that risk. Although this explanation is intuitive in the context of IPOs and SEOs, it is not clear
how issuing debt, initiating or omitting dividends, and announcing bank loans should aect stock liquidity.
But the evidence is again potentially consistent with our investment hypothesis, as discussed in Section 2.
28Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (2003) governance and Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell (2005) entrenchment
indexes. In addition, SEO rms are less vulnerable to overinvestment by empire-building
managers than matching nonissuers with similar size and book-to-market. Inconsistent with
the leverage-based explanation of SEO underperformance, even after equity issuance, SEO
rms have market and book leverage ratios higher than those of matching nonissuers.
As discussed in Section 2, the investment hypothesis in principle can be applied to other
external nancing anomalies including underperformance following IPOs, debt oerings, pri-
vate placements of equity, and loan announcements, as well as overperformance following
dividend initiations, tender oers, and open market share repurchases. The balance-sheet
constraint implies that rms raising capital should invest more and earn lower expected re-
turns, and that rms distributing capital should invest less and earn higher expected returns.
We plan to test these predictions in the future.
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33Table 1 : The Number of Seasoned Equity Oerings
This table reports the total number of SEOs sample in SDC by year (column 1), the number of SEOs that
can be matched with CRSP by NCUSIP (column 2), by CUSIP (column 3), the number of SEO rms on
NYSE (column 4), AMEX (column 5), and NASDAQ (column 6), the number of primary oerings (column
7), mixed oerings (column 8), the number of SEOs by non-utilities (column 9), non-nancials (column 10),
the number of SEOs by U.S. rms with common stocks on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ with return data
at some point during post-SEO period (column 11), and the number of rms from column 11 with valid
market size, book-to-market, and investment data (column 12).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Year All NCUSIP CUSIP NYSE AMEX NASD Prim Mix Non-Util Non-Fin US SEO-Inv
1970 92 91 55 66 26 0 54 38 58 88 72 62
1971 232 230 138 142 90 0 94 138 177 209 164 138
1972 218 217 141 135 69 14 87 131 164 200 165 144
1973 140 139 68 85 3 51 92 48 76 129 101 85
1974 82 81 33 62 2 17 65 17 30 81 68 63
1975 178 178 87 136 5 37 130 48 78 174 135 129
1976 190 187 112 123 17 50 130 60 101 183 150 137
1977 134 133 71 87 7 40 94 40 63 131 100 98
1978 179 178 101 104 14 61 127 52 105 166 143 128
1979 160 159 96 84 19 56 117 43 92 155 118 109
1980 319 317 208 158 41 120 227 92 229 308 244 223
1981 337 336 212 168 32 136 231 106 253 309 258 208
1982 361 360 232 235 27 99 194 167 267 328 279 234
1983 661 657 505 296 80 285 348 313 587 591 510 436
1984 202 201 139 92 18 92 118 84 172 155 140 106
1985 323 322 243 99 38 186 189 134 297 231 217 147
1986 414 413 300 106 48 260 248 166 390 275 278 195
1987 236 234 185 89 31 116 157 79 224 183 168 111
1988 114 111 92 39 20 55 70 44 101 90 88 64
1989 193 191 146 50 29 114 116 77 172 152 153 111
1990 148 148 114 54 21 73 82 66 135 122 117 86
1991 416 410 323 154 43 219 260 156 384 349 339 244
1992 421 420 334 173 49 199 261 160 387 316 330 216
1993 622 618 495 241 45 334 362 260 577 455 469 309
1994 389 387 327 176 23 189 224 165 372 299 263 190
1995 538 535 444 188 22 328 277 261 517 428 394 275
1996 674 671 552 246 27 401 337 337 660 527 493 335
1997 655 651 557 272 36 346 362 293 642 459 436 299
1998 498 496 435 252 25 221 301 197 477 319 312 215
1999 403 402 364 126 11 265 191 212 396 356 319 201
2000 355 355 328 87 10 258 176 179 344 332 306 208
2001 374 374 361 194 20 160 220 154 355 246 249 197
2002 385 385 370 225 13 147 267 118 356 275 255 194
2003 449 449 442 252 19 178 314 135 423 308 293 225
All 11,092 11,036 8,610 4,996 980 5,107 6,522 4,570 9,661 8,929 8,126 6,122
34Table 2 : Calendar-Time Factor Regressions of SEO portfolio Excess Returns
(January 1970 to December 2003)
This table reports calendar-time factor regressions of SEO portfolio excess returns. The portfolios consist of
rms that have conducted SEOs during 36 months (Panel A) and 60 months (Panel B) prior to the month
of portfolio formation. We use two factor models, the CAPM and the Fama and French (1993) three-factor
model. We obtain the factor returns, MKT, SMB, and HML from Kenneth French's website. The t-statistics
reported in parentheses are computed using White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Panel A: Prior 36-month SEO portfolios
Equally-weighted returns Value-weighted returns
CAPM Fama-French CAPM Fama-French
  0:279  0:291  0:356  0:280
( 1.91) ( 2.89) ( 3.56) ( 2.92)
MKT 1.282 1.131 1.124 1.084





Adj-R2 0.799 0.921 0.885 0.888
Panel B: Prior 60-month SEO portfolios
Equally-weighted returns Value-weighted returns
CAPM Fama-French CAPM Fama-French
  0.114  0.208  0.249  0.205
( 0.79) ( 2.29) ( 2.84) ( 2.56)
MKT 1.259 1.134 1.116 1.090





Adj-R2 0.792 0.932 0.915 0.917
35Table 3 : Calendar-Time Factor Regressions of SEO Portfolio Excess Returns onto
the Eckbo-Masulis-Norli (2000) Six-Factor Model (January 1970 to December 2002)
This table reports calendar-time factor regressions of portfolios consisting of rms that have conducted SEOs
during 36 months (Panel A) and 60 months (Panel B) prior to the month of portfolio formation. The model
of normal returns is the Eckbo-Masulis-Norli (2000) six-factor model. The sample period is from January
1970 to December 2002 because the data of the six factors from yvind Norli end at December 2002. The
factors are as follows. RM is the excess return on the CRSP value-weighted market index. 4RPC is a
factor mimicking portfolio for the percent change in the real per capita consumption of nondurable goods.
BAA AAA is a factor mimicking portfolio for the dierence in the monthly yield changes on bonds rated
BAA and AAA by Moody's. UI is a factor mimicking portfolio for unanticipated ination generated from
a model of expected ination involving a regression of real returns (returns on 30-day Treasury bills less
ination) on a 12 of its lagged values and a constant. 20y 1y is the return dierence between Treasury
bonds with 20 years to maturity and Treasury bonds with one year to maturity. TBILLspr is the return
dierence between 90-day and 30-day Treasury bills. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are computed
using White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Panel A: Prior 36-month SEOs Panel B: Prior 60-month SEOs
Equally-weighted Value-weighted Equally-weighted Value-weighted
  0.515  0.359  0.413  0.263
( 3.22) ( 3.38) ( 2.68) ( 3.00)
RM 1.297 1.112 1.271 1.105
(35.08) (37.60) (36.26) (46.00)
4RPC 1.121 0.261 1.296 0.147
(3.17) (1.47) (3.42) (0.97)
BAA AAA  0.062 0.451  0.193 0.411
( 0.18) (2.60) ( 0.61) (2.82)
UI 5.195  3.572 7.949  3.100
(2.45) ( 2.96) (3.95) ( 3.15)
(20y 1y)/100  0.201  0.029  0.185  0.028
( 3.23) ( 0.68) ( 3.03) ( 0.81)
TBillSpr/100 2.815 1.517 2.756 1.368
(1.87) (1.58) (1.85) (1.80)
Adj-R2 0.814 0.896 0.820 0.923
36Table 4 : Explaining the Investment Factor with the CAPM and the Fama-French
(1993) Three-Factor Model (January 1970 to December 2003) and with the
Eckbo-Masulis-Norli (2000) Six-Factor Model (January 1970 to December 2002)
This table reports calendar-time factor regressions of the investment factor using the CAPM, the Fama-
French (1993) three-factor model, and the Eckbo-Masulis-Norli (2000) six-factor model. We construct the
investment factor from a triple sort on size, book-to-market, and investment-to-asset ratio. Investment-to-
asset ratio is measured as the annual change in gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat annual
item 7) divided by the lagged book value of assets (item 6). In June of each year, we sort all stocks in
ascending order independently on size, book-to-market, and investment-to-asset ratio into three groups, the
top 30%, the medium 40%, and the bottom 30%. The investment factor is dened as the average low-
investment portfolio minus the average high-investment portfolio. The factor returns, MKT, SMB, and
HML are obtained from Kenneth French's website. The EMN six factors are from yvind Norli and are as
follows. RM is the excess return on the CRSP value-weighted market index. 4RPC is a factor mimicking
portfolio for the percent change in the real per capita consumption of nondurable goods. BAA AAA is a
factor mimicking portfolio for the dierence in the monthly yield changes on bonds rated BAA and AAA by
Moody's. UI is a factor mimicking portfolio for unanticipated ination generated from a model of expected
ination involving a regression of real returns (returns on 30-day Treasury bills less ination) on a constant
and 12 of its lagged values. 20y 1y is the return dierence between Treasury bonds with 20 years to
maturity and Treasury bonds with one year to maturity. TBILLspr is the return dierence between 90-
day and 30-day Treasury bills. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are computed using White (1980)
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
CAPM Fama-French EMN
 0.397 0.268  0.282
(4.88) (3.33) (3.06)
MKT  0.040 0.006 RM  0.054
( 2.09) (0.34) ( 2.88)
SMB 0.076 4RPC 0.035
(2.75) (0.18)






Adj-R2 0.011 0.124 0.089
37Table 5 : Calendar-Time Factor Regressions Augmented with the Investment Factor
(January 1970 to December 2003)
This table reports calendar-time factor regressions of excess returns of portfolios consisting of rms that
have conducted SEOs during 36 months (Panel A) and 60 months (Panel B) prior to the month of portfolio
formation. We augment the CAPM and the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model with the investment
factor, denoted INV. We obtain the factor returns MKT, SMB, and HML from Kenneth French's website.
We construct INV from a triple sort on size, book-to-market, and investment-to-asset ratio. Specically,
investment-to-asset ratio is measured as the annual change in gross property, plant and equipment (Com-
pustat annual item 7) divided by the lagged book value of assets (item 6). In June of each year, we sort
all stocks in ascending order independently on size, book-to-market, and investment-to-asset ratio into three
groups, the top 30%, the medium 40%, and the bottom 30%. The investment factor is dened as the average
low-investment portfolio minus the average high-investment portfolio. The t-statistics reported in parenthe-
ses are computed using White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. j4j=jj denotes the
reduction of alphas from using the investment factor as an additional explanatory variable divided by the
magnitudes of the alphas from the CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor model reported in Table 2.
Panel A: Prior 36-month SEO portfolios
Equally-weighted returns Value-weighted returns
CAPM Fama-French CAPM Fama-French
  0.151  0.166  0.195  0.177
( 0.94) ( 1.62) ( 2.12) (1.90)
MKT 1.270 1.134 1.108 1.087





INV  0.323  0.465  0.405  0.388
( 2.51) ( 5.84) ( 5.36) ( 5.91)
j4j=jj 0.459 0.430 0.452 0.368
Adj-R2 0.804 0.931 0.898 0.899
Panel B: Prior 60-month SEO portfolios
Equally-weighted returns Value-weighted returns
CAPM Fama-French CAPM Fama-French
  0.066  0.122  0.137  0.131
( 0.41) ( 1.27) ( 1.46) ( 1.65)
MKT 1.254 1.136 1.105 1.092





INV  0.120  0.322  0.280  0.278
( 0.96) ( 4.25) ( 4.30) ( 4.85)
j4j=jj 0.421 0.414 0.450 0.361
Adj-R2 0.792 0.937 0.922 0.923
38Table 6 : Calendar-Time Factor Regressions of SEO Portfolios onto Issuer-Purged Fama-French Factors and the
Purged and Unpurged Investment Factors (January 1975 to December 2003)
This table reports calendar-time factor regressions with and without the investment factor (both purged and unpurged of SEO rms). The dependent
variables are equally-weighted and value-weighted portfolio excess returns of rms that have conducted SEOs during 36 months (Panel A) and during
60 months (Panel B) prior to the month of portfolio formation. The size and book-to-market factors used in the regressions, denoted pSMB and pHML
respectively, are purged of rms that have issued new equity within the previous ve years. The data of pSMB and pHML are from Jay Ritter. The
issuer-purged investment factor, denoted pINV, is also purged of rms that have issued new equity within the previous 60 months. The sample starts
at January 1975 because we purge rms with prior 60-month SEOs. We also report factor regressions with pSMB, pHML, and unpurged investment
factor, denoted INV. We construct pINV and INV by triple sorting on size, book-to-market, and investment-to-asset. Specically, investment-to-asset
is measured as the annual change in gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat annual item 7) divided by the lagged book value of assets (item
6). In June of each year, we sort all stocks in ascending order independently on size, book-to-market, and investment-to-asset ratio into three groups,
the top 30%, the medium 40%, and the bottom 30%. The investment factor is dened as the average low-investment portfolio minus the average
high-investment portfolio. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are computed using White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
j4j=jj denotes the reduction of alphas from adding the investment factor (purged and unpurged) divided by the magnitudes of the alphas from the
purged Fama-French (1993) factor regressions.
Panel A: Prior 36-month SEO portfolio Panel B: Prior 60-month SEO portfolio
Equally-weighted Value-weighted Equally-weighted Value-weighted
  0.393  0.253  0.201  0.334  0.256  0.190  0.276  0.174  0.137  0.230  0.178  0.126
( 3.28) ( 2.11) ( 1.74) ( 2.85) ( 2.26) ( 1.74) ( 2.50) ( 1.50) ( 1.21) ( 2.39) ( 1.89) ( 1.38)
MKT 1.183 1.173 1.180 1.095 1.089 1.092 1.181 1.173 1.178 1.097 1.093 1.095
(30.53) (31.96) (34.70) (30.30) (31.10) (32.85) (31.27) (31.96) (33.61) (38.56) (39.46) (41.17)
pSMB 0.790 0.818 0.837 0.049 0.065 0.085 0.856 0.876 0.890 0.570 0.067 0.082
(14.49) (16.17) (17.67) (0.99) (1.35) (1.92) (16.57) (17.84) (18.98) (1.40) (1.71) (2.23)
pHML  0.140  0.038  0.017  0.113  0.057  0.021 0.003 0.077 0.092  0.062  0.024 0.004
( 1.99) ( 0.61) ( 0.29) ( 1.61) ( 0.85) ( 0.34) (0.05) (1.32) (1.59) ( 1.07) ( 0.44) (0.08)
pINV  0.482  0.267  0.349  0.179
( 5.54) ( 3.27) ( 4.24) ( 2.53)
INV  0.624  0.467  0.451  0.337
( 7.72) ( 6.47) ( 5.77) ( 5.39)
j4j=jj 0.356 0.489 0.234 0.431 0.370 0.504 0.226 0.452
Adj-R2 0.909 0.923 0.930 0.873 0.878 0.890 0.919 0.926 0.930 0.908 0.911 0.917
3
9Table 7 : Event-Time Factor Regressions, Equally-Weighted SEO Portfolios (January
1970 to December 2003)
This table reports event-time factor regressions of equally-weighted portfolios consisting of SEO rms for
three years after the event. Panel A uses factor models including the CAPM and the Fama and French
(1993) three-factor model. We obtain the factor returns MKT, SMB, and HML from Kenneth French's
website. Panel B augments the factor models in Panel A with the investment factor, INV. We construct
INV from a triple sort on size, book-to-market, and investment-to-asset ratio. Specically, investment-to-
asset is measured as the annual change in gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat annual item 7)
divided by the lagged book value of assets (item 6). In June of each year, we sort all stocks in ascending
order independently on size, book-to-market, and investment-to-asset ratio into three groups, the top 30%,
the medium 40%, and the bottom 30%. The investment factor is dened as the average low-investment
portfolio minus the average high-investment portfolio. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are computed
using White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. j4j=jj reported in Panel B denotes the
reduction of alphas from using the investment factor as an additional explanatory variable divided by the
magnitudes of the corresponding alphas without using the investment factor reported in Panel A. We do not
report this ratio when the alpha after adding the investment factor becomes positive.
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
CAPM Fama-French CAPM Fama-French CAPM Fama-French
Panel A: Factor regressions without the investment factor
  0.150  0.057  0.631  0.653  0.023  0.220
( 0.96) ( 0.54) ( 3.77) ( 4.65) ( 0.12) ( 1.46)
MKT 1.280 1.086 1.285 1.140 1.233 1.150
(32.32) (35.65) (30.72) (28.54) (23.72) (24.97)
SMB 0.679 0.679 0.817
(14.04) (8.42) (11.61)
HML  0.211  0.064 0.198
( 3.66) ( 0.89) (2.74)
Adj-R2 0.784 0.909 0.755 0.860 0.694 0.835
Panel B: Factor regressions with the investment factor
  0.037 0.027  0.455  0.494 0.085  0.067
( 0.24) (0.26) ( 2.48) ( 3.44) (0.40) ( 0.42)
MKT 1.269 1.088 1.270 1.148 1.222 1.156
(33.04) (36.93) (31.62) (31.06) (23.72) (26.88)
SMB 0.703 0.727 0.863
(15.27) (9.19) (12.88)
HML  0.149 0.059 0.315
( 2.63) (0.91) (4.76)
INV  0.283  0.314  0.454  0.612  0.275  0.590
( 2.52) ( 4.11) ( 2.85) ( 5.30) ( 1.56) ( 4.57)
j4j=jj 0.753   0.279 0.244   0.696
Adj-R2 0.788 0.914 0.766 0.878 0.697 0.852
40Table 8 : Event-Time Factor Regressions, Value-Weighted SEO Portfolios (January
1970 to December 2003)
This table reports event-time factor regressions of value-weighted portfolios consisting of SEO rms for three
years after the event. Panel A uses factor models including the CAPM and the Fama and French (1993) three-
factor model. We obtain the factor returns MKT, SMB, and HML from Kenneth French's website. Panel
B augments the factor models in Panel A with the investment factor, INV. We construct INV from a triple
sort on size, book-to-market, and investment-to-asset ratio. Specically, investment-to-asset is measured as
the annual change in gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat annual item 7) divided by the lagged
book value of assets (item 6). In June of each year, we sort all stocks in ascending order independently
on size, book-to-market, and investment-to-asset ratio into three groups, the top 30%, the medium 40%,
and the bottom 30%. The investment factor is dened as the average low-investment portfolio minus the
average high-investment portfolio. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are computed using White (1980)
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. j4j=jj reported in Panel B denotes the reduction of alphas
from using the investment factor as an additional explanatory variable divided by the magnitudes of the
corresponding alphas without using the investment factor reported in Panel A.
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
CAPM Fama-French CAPM Fama-French CAPM Fama-French
Panel A: Factor regressions without the investment factor
  0.298  0.240  0.602  0.500  0.141  0.185
( 2.52) ( 2.07) ( 4.30) ( 3.57) ( 1.09) ( 1.36)
MKT 1.099 1.055 1.141 1.084 1.127 1.151
(31.30) (28.66) (26.56) (26.03) (32.91) (29.26)
SMB 0.072 0.021  0.011
(1.43) (0.33) (-0.19)
HML  0.098  0.171 0.070
( 1.38) ( 2.03) (1.17)
Adj-R2 0.831 0.835 0.796 0.802 0.812 0.812
Panel B: Factor regressions with the investment factor
  0.150  0.140  0.414  0.384  0.074  0.124
( 1.34) ( 1.22) ( 2.97) ( 2.70) ( 0.56) ( 0.90)
MKT 1.084 1.058 1.125 1.090 1.120 1.154
(33.36) (30.06) (29.17) (27.10) (33.76) (29.43)
SMB 0.100 0.056 0.008
(2.14) (0.91) (0.15)
HML  0.024  0.081 0.117
( 0.36) ( 1.03) (1.91)
INV  0.372  0.375  0.483  0.448  0.171  0.234
( 4.29) ( 4.89) ( 3.98) ( 4.04) ( 1.73) ( 2.34)
j4j=jj 0.497 0.417 0.312 0.232 0.475 0.330
Adj-R2 0.842 0.845 0.813 0.815 0.814 0.816
41Table 9 : Equity Issuers and Matching Nonissuers' Investment-to-Asset and
Protability in Calendar Time (1970 to 2003)
This table reports equity issuers and matching nonissuers' investment-to-asset ratios and protability in
calendar time from 1970 to 2003. We report the median values of these two characteristics for the issuers and
matching nonissuer portfolios in the scal yearend prior to SEO. We also report the Z-statistics associated
with the Wilcoxon test for dierences in distributions. The null hypothesis is that the characteristics of
issuers and nonissuers are both drawn from the same distribution. We measure protability as net income
before extraordinary items (Compustat item 18) divided by lagged book value of assets (item 6). We measure
investment-to-asset as the change in gross property, plant, and equipment (item 7) divided by book assets.
Year Panel A: Investment-to-asset Panel B: Protability
non- non-
issuers issuers Z issuers issuers Z
1970 0.130 0.086 4.71 0.138 0.136 2.14
1971 0.111 0.074 5.39 0.158 0.142 2.78
1972 0.097 0.053 7.54 0.134 0.126 2.84
1973 0.131 0.047 7.65 0.137 0.112 3.33
1974 0.140 0.054 6.27 0.139 0.122 2.97
1975 0.124 0.062 8.03 0.140 0.145 1.20
1976 0.100 0.056 7.63 0.133 0.146 1.18
1977 0.107 0.049 7.06 0.129 0.129 1.00
1978 0.116 0.052 8.14 0.153 0.146 2.52
1979 0.139 0.063 7.78 0.144 0.142 0.63
1980 0.131 0.071 9.08 0.158 0.181 1.62
1981 0.123 0.068 8.62 0.143 0.167 0.45
1982 0.103 0.072 5.71 0.144 0.147 2.84
1983 0.078 0.066 5.40 0.136 0.135 1.90
1984 0.079 0.052 4.28 0.129 0.103 2.35
1985 0.109 0.071 6.72 0.172 0.117 5.22
1986 0.081 0.060 4.61 0.154 0.104 4.10
1987 0.089 0.057 3.88 0.119 0.087 0.10
1988 0.089 0.054 3.81 0.130 0.088 2.13
1989 0.103 0.050 6.10 0.126 0.088 3.26
1990 0.078 0.050 3.29 0.130 0.096 1.31
1991 0.084 0.050 5.88 0.112 0.106  0.35
1992 0.069 0.042 5.09 0.093 0.089 0.63
1993 0.058 0.043 6.16 0.102 0.090 1.57
1994 0.059 0.047 4.46 0.103 0.107  1.04
1995 0.078 0.054 6.29 0.118 0.110  0.43
1996 0.074 0.055 5.65 0.094 0.105  2.04
1997 0.106 0.061 7.82 0.132 0.121 0.74
1998 0.077 0.057 5.11 0.117 0.109  0.09
1999 0.104 0.052 6.96 0.110 0.139  2.49
2000 0.105 0.054 7.29 0.066 0.130  3.37
2001 0.058 0.055 3.72 0.102 0.139  2.37
2002 0.062 0.042 5.13 0.110 0.093 2.32
2003 0.027 0.024 3.76 0.047 0.059  3.18
All 0.090 0.054 36.09 0.129 0.128 1.96
42Table 10 : Cross-Sectional Tests of the Over-Investment Hypothesis by Splitting the
Sample Based on the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (2003) Governance Index (January 1990
to December 2003) and on the Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell (2005) Entrenchment Index
(January 1991 to December 2003)
This table reports cross-sectional regression tests of the over-investment hypothesis performed by splitting
the sample based on the Gompers-Ishii-Metrick (2003) corporate governance (G) index (Panels A and B)
and on the Bebchuk-Cohen-Ferrell (2005) entrenchment (E) index (Panels C and D). Panels A and B are
based on the intersection of our sample and that used by Gompers et al. that goes from 1990 to 2003. We
split the joint sample into two: the sample with strong shareholder rights contains rms with governance
index values less than or equal to nine (G9) and the sample with weak shareholder rights contains rms
with governance index values greater than or equal to ten (G10). Panels A and B report Fama-MacBeth
(1973) cross-sectional regressions of returns onto size, book-to-market, and investment-to-asset ratios in the
samples with G9 and G10, respectively. Panels C and D are based on the intersection of our sample and
that used by Bebchuk et al. that goes from 1991 to 2003. We split the joint sample into two subsamples: the
low-entrenchment sample contains rms with entrenchment index values less than or equal to two (E 2)
and the high-entrenchment sample contains rms with entrenchment index values greater than or equal to
three (E3). Panels C and D report Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of returns onto size,
book-to-market, and investment-to-asset ratios in the low-entrenchment and high-entrenchment samples,
respectively.
Panel A: Strong shareholder rights (G9) Panel B: Weak shareholder rights (G10)
log(ME) log(BE/ME) investment-to-asset log(ME) log(BE/ME) investment-to-asset
 1.308  0.789
( 3.03) ( 2.83)
 0.180  0.059  0.941  0.129  0.035  0.443
( 1.90) ( 0.35) ( 2.41) ( 1.52) ( 0.26) ( 1.56)
Panel C: Low entrenchment (E2) Panel D: High entrenchment (E3)
log(ME) log(BE/ME) investment-to-asset log(ME) log(BE/ME) investment-to-asset
 0.907  0.729
( 2.32) ( 1.86)
 0.188  0.153  0.597  0.154 0.116  0.202
( 1.96) ( 0.85) ( 1.73) ( 1.68) (0.83) ( 0.55)
43Table 11 : SEOs and Matching Firms' Corporate Governance Index (1990 to 2003)
and Entrenchment Index (1991 to 2003) in Calendar Time
Panels A and B of this table report issuers' and matching nonissuers' median and mean Governance indexes
based on Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) in calendar time from 1990 to 2003. Gompers et al. obtain
rm-level corporate governance provisions from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). The
index counts the number of unique provisions each rm, and it ranges from 1 to 24. We intersect the sample
used by Gompers et al. with our sample based on size, book-to-market, and investment-to-asset ratio. Panels
C and D of this table report issuers' and matching nonissuers' median and mean entrenchment indexes based
on Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) in calendar time from 1991 to 2003. Bebchuk et al. construct their
index based on six out of 24 provisions from the IRRC. The six provisions include staggered boards, limits
to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, supermajority requirements for
charter amendments, poison pills, and golden parachutes. The entrenchment index counts the number of
unique provisions each rm has in the sample, and it ranges from 0 to 6. We intersect the sample used by
Bebchuk et al. with our sample based on size, book-to-market, and investment-to-asset. In Panels A and C
we also report Z-statistics from the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test for dierences in distributions.
The null hypothesis is that the characteristics of issuers and nonissuers are both drawn from the same
distribution. In Panels B and D we report t-statistics for the dierences in means.
Panel A: Median governance index Panel B: Mean governance index
Year issuers non-issuers Z issuers non-issuers t
1990 9 8  0.35 8.926 9.009  0.15
1991 9 8  2.05 8.881 9.334  1.49
1992 9 8  1.08 8.903 9.247  0.86
1993 9 9  0.61 9.367 9.377  0.03
1994 9 9  1.17 8.854 9.245  0.87
1995 8 9  3.55 8.175 9.490  3.53
1996 9 9  0.79 9.333 9.322 0.03
1997 8.5 9  2.29 8.946 9.508  1.51
1998 8 8  2.19 8.313 9.092  2.05
1999 8 8.5  3.16 8.073 9.250  3.22
2000 8 9  3.29 8.085 9.303  3.20
2001 10 9 0.48 9.070 9.332  0.62
2002 9 9  1.03 9.315 9.359  0.16
2003 9 9  1.43 9.274 9.451  0.53
All 9 9  6.09 8.847 9.320  4.78
Panel C: Median entrenchment index Panel D: Mean entrenchment index
Year issuers non-issuers Z issuers non-issuers t
1991 3 2 0.38 2.387 2.312 0.32
1992 2 2  0.19 2.297 2.273 0.14
1993 2 2  1.91 2.188 2.276  0.69
1994 3 2  0.01 2.317 2.286 0.16
1995 2 2  2.01 2.091 2.392  1.51
1996 2 2  1.58 2.104 2.355  1.22
1997 2 2  1.99 2.024 2.388  2.03
1998 2 2  1.77 2.081 2.316  1.03
1999 2 2  1.54 2.000 2.304  1.32
2000 2 2  2.80 1.750 2.232  2.56
2001 3 2 1.35 2.635 2.317 1.64
2002 3 3  0.49 2.562 2.48 0.60
2003 3 3  0.21 2.580 2.47 0.73
All 2 2  3.26 2.261 2.344  1.66
44Table 12 : SEOs and Matching Firms' Market Leverage and Book Leverage in
Calendar Time (1970 to 2003)
This table reports SEOs and matching rms' market leverage and book leverage ratios in calendar time from
1970 to 2003. We report the median values of these two characteristics for the issuers and matching nonissuer
portfolios, as well as the Z-statistics associated with the Wilcoxon test for dierences in distributions. The
null hypothesis is that the characteristics of issuers and nonissuers are both drawn from the same distribution.
We measure market leverage as the sum of debt in current liabilities (item 9) and long-term debt (item 34)
divided by the sum of the market value of equity at the calendar year end and the book value of debt (item
9 plus item 34). We measure book leverage as the sum of item 9 plus item 34 divided by item 6.
Year Panel A: Market leverage Panel B: Book leverage
non- non-
issuers issuers Z issuers issuers Z
1970 0.441 0.291 3.97 0.562 0.318 5.35
1971 0.266 0.264 4.58 0.429 0.295 5.84
1972 0.270 0.231 4.16 0.402 0.273 6.54
1973 0.540 0.267 6.07 0.533 0.273 6.95
1974 0.683 0.471 6.32 0.575 0.297 6.77
1975 0.637 0.376 8.21 0.530 0.262 9.06
1976 0.511 0.301 5.99 0.473 0.255 7.58
1977 0.582 0.312 7.29 0.501 0.262 7.90
1978 0.538 0.304 7.74 0.484 0.264 8.37
1979 0.535 0.308 7.31 0.482 0.273 8.23
1980 0.270 0.204 6.42 0.451 0.262 8.80
1981 0.342 0.231 7.01 0.444 0.260 8.64
1982 0.342 0.318 5.55 0.379 0.235 8.27
1983 0.230 0.193 4.79 0.303 0.233 8.52
1984 0.243 0.258 2.26 0.313 0.236 4.09
1985 0.187 0.159 2.59 0.326 0.248 4.76
1986 0.187 0.143 3.09 0.297 0.242 4.25
1987 0.244 0.199 3.05 0.314 0.253 3.99
1988 0.272 0.178 2.47 0.384 0.256 3.77
1989 0.200 0.217 1.30 0.385 0.252 4.10
1990 0.186 0.197 0.45 0.341 0.239 2.95
1991 0.183 0.182 1.43 0.322 0.222 5.09
1992 0.240 0.176 4.02 0.343 0.211 6.90
1993 0.178 0.156 4.85 0.295 0.195 7.56
1994 0.106 0.106 1.63 0.235 0.182 4.05
1995 0.083 0.116 0.94 0.240 0.191 4.76
1996 0.096 0.119 2.62 0.276 0.192 7.09
1997 0.114 0.078 4.28 0.309 0.174 8.05
1998 0.180 0.129 6.26 0.385 0.181 8.64
1999 0.103 0.065 2.47 0.295 0.201 6.50
2000 0.029 0.074  2.47 0.164 0.186 3.44
2001 0.135 0.107 3.94 0.288 0.180 6.70
2002 0.299 0.177 6.86 0.365 0.186 8.19
2003 0.250 0.060 2.66 0.273 0.083 3.47
All 0.220 0.193 16.96 0.358 0.208 38.89


















46Figure 2 : The Frequency Distribution and New Equity-to-Asset Ratio of SEO Firms Across Size and Book-to-Market
Quintiles (January 1970 to December 2003)
Panel A of this gure plots the number of SEO rms in each of the 25 size and book-to-market portfolios. Panel B reports the median new equity-
to-asset ratio among equity issuers by size and book-to-market quintiles. We measure book assets as Compustat annual item 6. We calculate size
as the price at the end of June times the number of shares outstanding. We dene book equity as stockholder's equity (item 216), minus preferred
stock, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (item 35) if available, minus post-retirement benet asset (item 330) if available. If
stockholder's equity is missing, we use common equity (item 60) plus preferred stock par value (item 130). If these variables are missing, we use book
assets (item 6) less liabilities (item 181). We measure preferred stock as preferred stock liquidating value (item 10), or preferred stock redemption
value (item 56), or preferred stock par value (item 130), in that order of availability. To calculate the book-to-market ratio, we use the market size at
the end of the scal year, which is December closing price times the number of shares outstanding. We obtain the size and book-to-market quintile
breakpoints from Kenneth French's website. We measure new equity-to-asset as the market value of new equity (obtained from SDC) divided by the
book value of assets at the end of the scal year preceding the equity issue.
Panel A: Number of SEOs by ME and BE/ME Quintiles














































7Figure 3 : Equity Issuers' and Matching Nonissuers' Investment-to-Asset and
Protability During 60 Months After Equity Issuance (January 1970 to December
2003)
This gure plots SEO rms' and matching nonissuers' median investment-to-asset ratio and protability
during 60 months after equity issuance in Panels A and C, as well as their corresponding Z-statistics from
the Wilcoxon test for testing distributional dierences in Panels B and D, respectively. Z statistics between
-2 and 2 indicate failure to reject the null hypothesis of equal distribution of characteristics between SEOs
and their matching rms. Month 0 is the month of equity issuance. We measure investment-to-asset ratio as
the ratio of the change in gross property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item 7) and lagged book assets
(item 6). Protability is dened as net income before extraordinary items (item 18) divided by lagged book
assets. The solid lines are for issuers and the broken lines are for matching nonissuers. We use the following
matching procedure. At the end of June every year, all rms that have not issued equity within the prior 36
months are sorted by their size and book-to-market equity to form 25 size and book-to-market portfolios of
nonissuers. For each issuer, we use the breakpoints of size and book-to-market sort to identify its matching
portfolio. The matching portfolio's median characteristics are then compared with those of the issuer.






















































































































48Figure 4 : The Frequency Distribution of SEOs across Investment-to-Asset Deciles
(January 1970 to December 2003)
This gure plots the number of SEO rms in each of the investment-to-asset deciles. We measure book assets
as Compustat annual item 6, and we measure capital investment as the change in item 7 (gross property,
plant, and equipment). We sort nonissuing rms each year by their investment-to-asset ratios to obtain the



























49Figure 5 : SEO Firms' and Matching Firms' Corporate Governance Indexes During
60 Months After Equity Issuance (January 1990 to December 2003)
This gure plots SEO rms' (solid lines) and matching rms' (dotted lines) median and mean corporate
governance indices as dened by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) during 60 months after equity issuance
in Panels A and C, respectively. We also report in Panel B the Z-statistics from the Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank test for distributional dierences in the median indices between issuers and nonissuers. Z
statistics between  2 and 2 indicate failure to reject the null hypothesis of equal distribution of characteristics
between issuers and nonissuers. Panel D reports the t-statistics for zero-dierence between the mean indices
between the two classes of rms. Month 0 is the month of equity issuance. Gompers et al. obtain rm-level
corporate governance provisions from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). The index counts
the number of unique provisions each rm has in the sample, and it ranges from 1 to 24. We use the following
matching procedure. At the end of June every year, all rms that have not issued equity within the prior 36
months are sorted by their size and book-to-market equity to form 25 size and book-to-market portfolios of
nonissuers. For each issuer, we use the breakpoints of size and book-to-market sort to identify its matching
portfolio. The matching portfolio's median and mean characteristics are then compared with those of the
issuer.























































































































50Figure 6 : SEO Firms' and Matching Firms' Entrenchment Indexes During 60
Months After Equity Issuance (January 1991 to December 2003)
This gure plots SEO rms' (solid lines) and matching rms' (dotted lines) median and mean entrenchment
indexes as dened by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2005) during 60 months after equity issuance in Panels A
and C, respectively. We also report in Panel B the Z-statistics from the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank
test for distributional dierences in the median indices between issuers and nonissuers. Z statistics between
 2 and 2 indicate failure to reject the null hypothesis of equal distribution of characteristics between issuers
and nonissuers. Panel D reports the t-statistics for zero-dierence between the mean indices between the
two classes of rms. Month 0 is the month of equity issuance. Bebchuk et al. construct their entrenchment
index based on six out of 24 provisions from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). The six
provisions are staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for
mergers, supermajority requirements for charter amendments, poison pills, and golden parachutes. The
index counts the number of unique provisions each rm has in the sample, and it ranges from 0 to 6. We use
the following matching procedure. At the end of June every year, all rms that have not issued equity within
the prior 36 months are sorted by their size and book-to-market equity to form 25 size and book-to-market
portfolios of nonissuers. For each issuer, we use the breakpoints of size and book-to-market sort to identify
its matching portfolio. The matching portfolio's median and mean characteristics are then compared with
those of the issuer.
























































































51Figure 7 : SEO Firms' and Matching Firms' Market Leverage and Book Leverage
During 60 Months After Equity Issuance (1970 to 2003)
This gure plots issuers' and matching nonissuers' median market leverage ratio and book leverage ratio
during 60 months after equity issuance in Panels A and C, respectively, and their corresponding Z-statistics
from the Wilcoxon test for testing distributional dierences in Panels B and D. Z statistics between -2 and
2 indicate failure to reject the null hypothesis of equal distribution of characteristics between SEOs and
their matching rms. Month 0 is the month of equity issuance. We dene book leverage as the sum of debt
in current liabilities (Compustat annual item 9) and long-term debt (item 34) divided by the lagged book
value of assets. The denominator of the market leverage ratio is the market value of the rm, calculated
as the sum of the market value of equity (December closing price times number of shares outstanding) and
the book value of debt (item 9 plus item 34). The solid lines are for issuers and the broken lines are for
matching nonissuers. We use the following matching procedure. At the end of June every year, all rms
that have not issued equity within the prior 36 months are sorted by their size and book-to-market equity
to form 25 size and book-to-market portfolios of nonissuers. For each issuer, we use the breakpoints of size
and book-to-market sort to identify its matching portfolio. The matching portfolio's median characteristics
are then compared with those of the issuer.
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